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CROWDFUNDING’S IMPACT ON
START-UP IP STRATEGY
Sean M. O’Connor *

INTRODUCTION
“Crowdfunding” has been heralded as a revolutionary and democratic
way to connect ordinary individuals with innovative projects they would
like to support. Congress endorsed this concept by including the
CROWDFUND Act in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS
Act” or “Act”) of 2012. 1 The statute was not directed at well-known
crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter and IndieGoGo—sites that facilitate
“project crowdfunding” through a lightly regulated donation model. Rather,
the JOBS Act provides a mechanism for ordinary investors and start-ups to
use “enterprise crowdfunding,” in which the start-ups can offer and sell
their stock widely through the Internet. These activities were effectively
prohibited under pre-JOBS Act securities laws.
While the JOBS Act was credited with creating a legal pathway for enterprise crowdfunding, start-ups cannot avail themselves of it until the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgates the rules mandated under the Act. 2 At the same time, the Act mandates other changes in
securities regulations which may make enterprise crowdfunding less appealing than other private financing options. The Act generally relaxed
mandatory information disclosure requirements and the ability to use the
Internet to solicit investment under these other options, even as it erected
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; J.D., Stanford Law School; M.A.
(philosophy), Arizona State University; B.A. (history), University of Massachusetts, Boston. I would
like to thank Adam Mossoff, Ed Kitch, John Duffy, Camilla Hrdy, Mark Schultz, Matt Barblan, Abraham Cable, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, and all the participants at the Law and Entrepreneurship Association
Retreat held at the University of Washington in February 2014 and at the George Mason University
Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (“CPIP”) inaugural conference on patents, The Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation Economy, held at George Mason University School
of Law in September 2013, and the editors at the George Mason Law Review. I would also like to thank
CPIP for generous research support. All errors are mine. Comments welcome at soconnor@uw.edu.
1 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-305, 126 Stat. 306, 315
(2012).
2 Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Crowdfunding]. The comments
period ends February 3, 2014. Thus, a final rulemaking authorizing equity crowdfunding might be
promulgated in spring or summer 2014. On October 23, 2013, the SEC issued proposed rules for “Regulation Crowdfunding.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press
Release/1370540017677#.Uv-5-aDDhG4.
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significant disclosure requirements for the new enterprise crowdfunding
pathway. 3
A number of commentators are highly skeptical of enterprise
crowdfunding or of the JOBS Act as a means to enable it. Some are worried
about the potential for fraud and abuse.4 Others worry that small-time “retail investors” who invest through crowdfunding in tech start-ups will not
understand the dilution risks they face from later venture capital (“VC”)
financing rounds. 5 And a number fear that the regulatory hurdles required
by the JOBS Act, and underscored in the SEC’s proposed rulemaking, will
simply make the costs of enterprise crowdfunding too high for firms that
might benefit from it. 6
Notwithstanding these criticisms, enterprise crowdfunding will become a reality sooner rather than later, and tech start-ups will be among the
first to explore using it. Yet no one appears to have written about the effects
of enterprise crowdfunding on start-ups’ intellectual property (“IP”) strategies. Because IP is arguably the most important asset a start-up holds, this
relationship is worth considering. This Paper provides preliminary thoughts
about this topic.
The Paper proceeds in Part I by reviewing the crowdfunding landscape
and its potential benefits for start-ups, especially with regard to IP strategies. Part II examines the provisions of the JOBS Act and argues that the
disclosure requirements of the CROWDFUND Act title will make the latter
less attractive than other start-up financing options and may negatively affect start-ups’ IP strategies, in part by risking the disclosure of enabling
aspects of patentable inventions. Part III explores issues arising from the
widespread involvement of many potentially unsophisticated investors who
have no connection to the start-up. This contrasts with current unsophisticated investors in start-ups who are usually limited to friends and family of
the founders. The lack of a direct connection means that unsophisticated
crowdfunding investors may neither understand the realities and risks of
3

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302, 126 Stat. at 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d1(a)(3), (b)(1)(G) (2012)).
4 See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1763-66 (2012); Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious
Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 389 (2012) (“Despite its promise,
crowdfunding under the JOBS Act could fizzle or bomb. . . . There is . . . a chance that crowdfunding
will become a tool for Internet frauds and schemes, at first harming investors and eventually scaring
them away.”).
5 See John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg,
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L, 583, 616-19
(2013).
6 See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40
SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 216-17 (2012); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption:
Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2012).
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start-ups’ IP portfolios nor have the inside access to information and management that traditional friend and family investors enjoy. The Paper concludes with suggestions for how start-ups should manage these issues, as
the popular appeal of crowdfunding virtually ensures that start-ups will use
it once the SEC promulgates the final rules implementing the
CROWDFUND Act.
I.

THE CROWDFUNDING LANDSCAPE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR
START-UPS

While there seems to be no official definition of “crowdfunding,” it is
generally understood to be the web-based general solicitation of funding for
a venture, with the expectation that many contributors might each commit
to only a small amount. 7 In the aggregate, the amount contributed will
hopefully be enough to fund the designated project or venture. Some legal
commentators view all crowdfunding through the lens of “investments”—
even as they acknowledge that much of it does not involve equity or debt
but rather donations or rewards.8 This misconception is unfortunate because
it obscures crowdfunding’s origins and continuing vitality as a funding
mechanism for cultural or nonprofit projects that will neither be “commercial” nor profitable. Thus, there is neither an “investment” (other than as we
might say that a philanthropist “invests” in a charitable project) nor interest
in financial return. The most famous crowdfunding sites—Kickstarter 9 and
IndieGoGo 10—are by their own terms and intent not investment oriented.
Likewise, Kiva, the famous crowdfunded micro-lending site, intends to
economically benefit only the poor individuals who receive micro-loans
through it. 11
One accepted taxonomy breaks crowdfunding into four categories: (1)
donation sites; (2) reward and pre-purchase sites; (3) lending sites (both
those offering interest and those that do not); and (4) equity sites.12 This
framework is reasonable based on the nature of the “transaction.” It also
aids analyses of whether particular kinds of transactions might be considered “securities” that fall within the regulation of the securities laws—an
issue of major concern to all involved with crowdfunding of any stripe.
For the purposes of this Paper, a simple bifurcation suffices: “project
crowdfunding,” in which contributors fund a defined project; and “enter7

See, e.g., Crowdfunding, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdfunding (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014).
8 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 10-27 (referring to even charitable donors as “investors”).
9 KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
10 INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
11 About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
12 Bradford, supra note 8, at 14-27.
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prise crowdfunding,” where investors contribute capital that can be used as
capital for ongoing general operating and development expenses of an organization. 13 Kickstarter and IndieGoGo are firmly in the project camp, and
this helps them avoid securities law issues. Kiva engages in enterprise
crowdfunding, but through micro-loans that do not generate interest or any
direct economic benefit to the funders. Part II briefly reviews the fundamentals of what makes something a security and how those fundamentals
bear on whether a particular type of crowdfunding will be deemed a security.
The bifurcation model is important because building an IP portfolio
for a start-up is a long-term capital expense.14 Individual IP assets can of
course arise from discrete projects, but the funding model for each project
often does not include monies for IP procurement. This situation is especially true for patents, which will take a year or more and tens of thousands
of dollars to prosecute. Prolonged litigation can quickly diverge from the
project timeline. Further, it is hard to know during advance financial planning for a project whether inventions will arise that need to be budgeted for.
Thus, such funding may be left out of project budgets. Cash-strapped startups, particularly those run by first-time entrepreneurs, often do not budget
for patent prosecution because they have not thought of it, do not understand the magnitude of costs, or simply cannot do it due to lack of forecasted investments and revenues.
For those start-ups that do seek to budget for IP, the question is where
to get the money. Technology start-ups generally will have no revenue for a
number of years while developing their products/services and business
model. Even when revenues come in, the monies may barely offset fixed
costs of salaries, facilities, and supplies. Hence the start-up metric of “burn
rate”—the amount of money beyond revenues the company will burn each
month as it develops products/services. An IP budget will be far down the
list of expenses to be budgeted for. Thus, it will have to come from capital
investments.
VC-funded start-ups can usually budget for IP expenses. Venture capital fund managers (“VCs”) understand both burn rate and the need for IP
protection. In fact, anecdotally speaking, VCs balk at a possible investment
if the founders seem to be low-balling their burn rate and expenses. VCs
expect relatively high burn rates—the focus is on fast development, launch,
and growth, not penny-pinching. While there is mixed evidence as to the
insistence of VCs for patent protection in some industries (e.g., software),
13 Professor Mirit Eyal-Cohen pointed out to me that nonprofits could use enterprise
crowdfunding as well. They would of course need another mechanism besides equity to accomplish this.
14 Many of the comments in the remainder of this Part are derived from personal experience as
counsel to start-up companies over 10 years in private practice and through the Entrepreneurial Law
Clinic at UW Law School (“UW ELC”). Entrepreneurial Law Clinic, U. OF WASH. SCH. OF L.,
http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/entrepreneurial (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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in other industries it is imperative.15 And in all industries, VCs will still
want to see some form of IP protection (if only trade secrets) at least until/unless first mover advantage is achieved. Law firms representing startups involved in a professional money raise from VCs will counsel founders
to include these kinds of capital needs in the discussions and in the amount
sought.
Angel-funded start-ups can be in a different position. Sophisticated
tech-focused angels, such as those in Silicon Valley and Seattle, will operate similarly to VCs with regard to burn rate and IP expenses. Angels in
those markets are often former tech professionals who had a great exit as
either an employee or founder of another tech company, and so they know
the importance of IP and fast-growth funding. 16 But angels in other markets
may not understand the start-up trajectory and needs. In those cases, IP
budget funding may not be available, with potentially deleterious consequences on the start-up’s ability to monetize its investment in R&D.
The acute problem, however, is for start-ups that are bootstrapping 17 or
relying (so far) only on friend and family investments. Unless the friends
and family are quite generous and savvy to the needs for fast-growth and IP
funding, they may not be willing to invest funds for patent procurement.18
Where there are no funds, there will be no ability to pursue patent applications. 19 The opportunity for pursuing patent applications is also not especially flexible. Should the start-up deliver products or services embodying
15 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1259, 1295-1302 (2009); Ted
Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 113, 117-19 (2010).
16 I adopt the definition of “angels” as high-net-worth individuals investing directly in a start-up
(or at most through a personal investment vehicle). By contrast, “VCs” are the managers of a VC fund
who make portfolio company investment decisions on behalf of the fund. They may “co-invest” their
own money alongside that of the fund, but their main function is as fund managers.
17 Using the founders’ own money and, often, their personal credit card debt.
18 Procurement of other forms of IP is far less expensive than that for patents. Trade secrets are
“free” in that they only require physical protections against disclosure and legally binding agreements
such as nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements with those who need to practice them on behalf of
the start-up or its suppliers. Copyright is “free” in that it inheres automatically upon the fixation of the
expression in a tangible medium; registration with the Copyright Office is required in order to bring
court enforcement actions of one’s copyright, and is advisable earlier for full protection of rights, but is
fairly inexpensive. Trademarks and trade dress rights are also “free,” as they accrue as a matter of state
law on use of the mark on products/services in commerce. Federal registration is desirable, and requires
basic examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), but the cost to do this is still
relatively low.
19 Some law school clinics, such as UW ELC, provide limited low- or no-cost patent application
services to low-income inventors, with the inventor responsible only for out-of-pocket costs such as
USPTO fees. The USPTO has also coordinated development of consortiums of pro bono patent attorneys in certain markets to deliver low- or no-cost patent applications on a similar basis. Programs currently exist in Minneapolis, Seattle, and other cities across the country. See, e.g., Pro Bono, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/inventors/proseprobono (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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the invention, before filing a patent application, it may lose its rights to file
under Section 102(b)(1). 20 Similarly, public use or disclosure of the invention before filing the application may also lead to a loss of patent rights. 21
The rules are effectively the same in many other countries. For fast-growth
companies with global ambitions, this result could be quite detrimental to
their plans. At the same time, the possible need for foreign filings will only
add to the expected patent procurement budget.22
Start-ups arguably need patents even more than established firms do.
Patents provide a critical tool in the David-and-Goliath competition they
will have with larger incumbents in the field they seek to disrupt. 23 Incumbents can wait for the start-up to invest significant resources in developing
and launching a valuable new good or service and then simply copy it, using their economies of scale, existing manufacturing, and lack of R&D
costs to deliver the good or service more cheaply and broadly. While some
could argue this benefits society and is in the nature of free market competition, it seems likely to discourage start-ups that will not be able to obtain
fair returns on their R&D. With so much innovation coming from start-ups,
these hurdles will likely reduce overall innovation, producing a net social
cost (assuming one sees innovation as a desideratum). Patents allow startups to appropriate the value of their R&D results by giving them legally
enforceable exclusive rights that can be exercised against large incumbents
seeking to copy the start-ups’ innovations. 24
Given the need for patents and other IP, start-ups desperately need
funds to procure these rights. If they cannot secure them from VCs, angels,
friends and family, or their own personal resources, they need another avenue. Given the interest in funding innovation evinced by contributors to
Kickstarter, IndieGoGo, and similar sites, crowdfunding seems to be a natural fit. But the existing sites allow only project funding. Thus, a start-up
20

35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
Id. There is a limited grace period for public disclosures of inventions in some circumstances,
but inventors should not rely on it without careful guidance from a patent attorney.
22 Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, inventors who are in Paris Convention signatory countries can file in their home jurisdiction as either “domestic” or “international” applicants and then file
national applications in other Paris Convention countries within the year. See PCT FAQs, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/faqs/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). But these
rights will only be available if the applicant files in his or her home jurisdiction before any sale, public
use, or disclosure.
23 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring); see
also Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577–87 (2009); Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff &
Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222 (2008) (“[P]atents are powerful antimonopoly weapons—the
vital slingshots ‘Davids’ use to take on ‘Goliaths.’”).
24 Even with patents, many start-ups face significant challenges from deep-pocketed incumbents
who may seek to infringe the start-up’s rights anyway, forcing the start-up to engage in expensive and
distracting litigation.
21
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would have to seek project-based contributions for patent and other IP expenses. It is not clear that crowdfunding recipients are accountable for their
use of funds received by the sites’ terms and conditions (or otherwise). 25
Conceivably, a start-up could simply hope to raise enough project funding
to cover the costs of the projects, any rewards that must be delivered (including delivery costs!), and procurement of IP arising from the project. So
long as the rewards are fulfilled when the project is completed, then this
appears to discharge the project creator’s obligations under the terms and
conditions. However, given the project-based sites’ insistence that only
projects be funded, the nature of patent prosecution costs as arguably enterprise capital expenses may mean that something beyond a project is being
funded. At the same time, nothing in the terms and conditions of these sites
indicate that a project creator is limited to the collection of the actual costs
of developing and delivering the project rewards. Presumably, the creator
can set any contribution levels for rewards, including a “profit” margin. The
market will determine whether contributors want to contribute that amount.
This “loophole” likely just underscores the origins of these crowdfunding
sites as a means to fund otherwise un-fundable projects—meaning things
not expected to be profitable. Whatever the intent, at this point the financing of IP procurement from project crowdfunding may sit in a contractual
gray area.
Equity enterprise crowdfunding would remove any uncertainty about
the use of funds for IP procurement. Monies received would be capital investments based on issuance of stock, bonds, or debentures. 26 Unless the
terms of such instruments limited the use of proceeds and excluded IP expenses, the start-up could use the funds for any lawful capital expenses.27
What often surprises first-time entrepreneurs is that patent procurement
expenses may be the single largest cash outlay they will have to make.
While the fair market value of salaries will be larger, the actual cash outlay
is only a fraction of that total value because significant portions of compensation will be through stock grants and options. Some other costs can be
mitigated by issuance of stock options as well.28 But few good patent attorneys will take equity for their services. There is too much quality-billablehour-paying work from established companies for patent attorneys to

25 See, e.g., Terms of Use, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/terms-of-use?ref=footer
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014); Guidelines, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/guidelines?
ref=footer (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
26 The SEC supports the full range of debt and equity securities for crowdfunding. See
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,457-58.
27 Under the proposed “Regulation Crowdfunding,” as it is known, the issuer must disclose the
use of proceeds in any crowdfunding offering. Id. at 66,440.
28 Founders sometimes become too cavalier in using equity to pay for things. This can lead to a
bloated capitalization table (the table showing how the company is capitalized), which in turn can deter
later professional investors such as VCs. This is discussed further in Part II.
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speculate on equity. 29 Thus, crowdfunding could turn into a critical source
of cash to procure patents in a timely fashion.
Enterprise crowdfunding is needed for start-ups to plan and execute
proper IP strategies, which in turn provide bedrock value assets for the firm.
While angel- or VC-funded start-ups will not have this same need, they are
the minority of start-ups. Project crowdfunding might enable some start-ups
to fund IP procurement, but this likely cannot be an explicit goal of such
fundraising (under the most popular sites’ terms of service). Plus the
crowdfunding “market” might be unwilling to allow start-ups to covertly
price IP procurement into contribution amounts (i.e., potential funders will
not contribute to a campaign, correctly deeming the value of the express
project’s reward lower than the amount requested). Any use of funds raised
for the “project” which instead go to IP procurement may fall into a legal
gray zone with regard to the start-up’s contractual relationship with the
crowdfunding site and the quasi-contract relationship with funders. Accordingly, enterprise crowdfunding presents the “cleanest” solution to the problem. But selling unregistered equity, such as that issued by pre-IPO startups, through mass-market channels was one of the core prohibitions of the
securities laws before passage of the JOBS Act. Thus, the next Part unpacks
the changes the Act makes to securities laws to allow enterprise
crowdfunding and other avenues for general solicitation of investors
through the Internet. In particular, it focuses on the disclosure requirements
for these different avenues.
II.

JOBS ACT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS’ IMPACT ON CROWDFUNDING
START-UPS

The core premise of the federal securities laws is that the government
should not review the merits of investments represented by offers of securities, but rather simply mandate disclosures from the issuers of these securities so that investors can make reasonably informed decisions.30 The form
and scope of disclosure sought by lawmakers at the time of drafting the
laws would have placed prohibitive costs on smaller issuers. Thus, a distinction was created between “private” and “public” issuers.31 Some securities issued by private issuers are exempted from registration with the SEC,
29 Admittedly there might be more upside for the attorney who takes equity—and the client’s
stock becomes highly valuable—but in most cases equity stakes turn out to be worthless. Thus, patent
attorneys in private practice strongly prefer hourly cash rates, and high ones at that, given their expertise. Those who want to take the equity route will often go in-house and become part of the team. This
gives them more access to information on where the start-up is going, greater potential to help guide the
start-up, a higher rate of equity compensation, and the excitement of being part of the team.
30 See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 34 (1959).
31 Id. at 37.
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and the issuer is not subject to mandatory disclosure, under Section 3 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”). 32 Securities of private issuers
not exempted could still be sold without registration in certain exempted
transactions under Section 4 of the Securities Act.33 Further sales of those
securities would need to be pursuant to registered offerings or another exempt transaction. In either case, the key to maintaining “private” status was
to not engage in “general solicitations” or “public offerings.”
While the line between offerings subject to registration and disclosure
and those exempted was based on the public-private distinction, the exact
nature of general solicitations or public offerings was not detailed in the
Securities Act. Case law on the subject centered on tests of whether the
offerees were part of a limited, defined set of persons who either had a substantial connection to the issuer or were sophisticated investors who could
negotiate for the information and/or control rights that would enable them
to make reasonable decisions as to initial investment and the period during
which they might continue to hold the security. 34 But there was great uncertainty about how to ensure that any particular offering would be considered
exempt. At the same time, structuring an offering incorrectly—even with
good faith intent to avoid a public offering—meant that the offering could
later be deemed to have violated Section 5 of the Securities Act as an unregistered public offering. 35 Potential penalties include rescission of the
offer, fines, and even prohibition of future offerings. 36
A.

Regulation D

The uncertainty surrounding the proper structuring of private or limited offerings arguably led to fewer such offerings than would be optimal
for small-firm capital raising and prompted the SEC in 1980 to promulgate
Regulation D (“Reg D”). 37 Three safe harbors for private offerings were
created that, if complied with, would allow the issuer greater certainty that
the offering would not later be deemed an illegal unregistered public offering. Rule 504, promulgated under Section 3 for exempt securities, allows an
issuer to sell up to $1 million of unrestricted stock to any number of pur-

32

Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 75-77 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77c

(2012)).
33

Id. at 77 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77d).
See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
35 48 Stat. at 77-78 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77e).
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l.
37 Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers
and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262 (Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506).
34
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chasers. 38 Rule 505, promulgated under Section 4 for exempt transactions,
allows an issuer to sell up to $5 million of restricted stock to up to thirtyfive non-accredited investors, plus any number of accredited investors.39
The stock must be restricted because it was exempted from Section 5’s registration requirements only for the particular Rule 505-compliant offering.
The purchaser buys under the express restriction—listed in a legend on the
face of the stock certificate itself—that she may not resell it absent registration by the issuer or another exempt transaction. Likewise, Rule 506, also
promulgated under Section 4, allows an issuer to sell an unlimited dollar
value of restricted stock to up to thirty-five non-accredited investors, and an
unlimited number of accredited investors, but only where the nonaccredited investors are themselves, or with their purchaser representative,
“sophisticated.” 40
All of the safe harbors were originally subject to Rule 502’s prohibition on general solicitations. 41 This condition was congruent with the securities laws’ focus on registering offerings of securities to the general public
so that the SEC might ascertain that the information disclosed to potential
investors adequately conveyed the nature and risks of the investment. Thus,
the narrowly limited exception for general solicitations under Rule 504 was
reserved for those offerings that were registered and subject to adequate
information disclosure under a state’s securities laws. 42 The prohibition on
general solicitation meant that mass distribution channels of communicating
offers to potential investors, such as the Internet, could not be used. This
prohibition in turn effectively eliminated crowdfunding, at least under the
current popular model facilitated by websites.
38 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2013). However, the issuer must offer and sell in compliance with state
laws requiring registration and public filing of the registration statement, together with delivery of a
substantive disclosure document to investors.
39 Id. § 230.505. Accredited investors include: (1) banks; (2) private business development corporations; (3) 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations and “Massachusetts or similar” trusts or business partnerships (not formed for the express purpose of buying the securities) with over $5 million in assets; (4)
directors, executive officers, and/or general partners of the issuer; (5) natural persons, alone or with their
spouse, having more than $1 million in net worth (not including value of primary residence); (6) natural
persons who have had an annual income over $200,000 for the past two years, or who with their spouses
have had an annual income over $300,000 for the past two years, and have a reasonable expectation of
reaching the same income level in the current year; (7) any trust with over $5 million in assets (not
formed for the express purpose of buying the securities), where the purchase of the securities is guided
by a “sophisticated person” (as defined under Rule 506(b)(2)(ii)); and (8) any entity in which all entity
owners are accredited purchasers. Id. § 230.501(a).
40 Id. § 230.506. A “sophisticated” investor is one who “alone, or with his purchaser representative(s), has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately
prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.” Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
41 Id. § 230.502(c). Issuers could engage in general solicitation as part of a Rule 504 offering so
long as they sold only to accredited investors.
42 Id. § 230.504(b)(i).
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The limitations on offers and sales to non-accredited investors in Reg
D offerings presented another serious impediment to crowdfunding. A cap
of thirty-five non-accredited investors under Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings hardly rises to the level of what we think of as crowdfunding. While it
is true that the number of accredited investors is not capped, the nature of
such investors—as relatively wealthy individuals or entities—conflicts with
the ambitions of crowdfunding to democratize investment. At the same
time, Rule 504’s allowance of an unlimited number of non-accredited investors is tempered for the purposes of crowdfunding by the limit of the
offering amount to $1 million. In the realm of project crowdfunding this
change might seem to be no problem at all. Raising money through hundreds or thousands of relatively small contributions is exactly what many
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo campaigns do. In fact, the $1 million limit is
probably higher than is raised in the average campaign. But start-ups that
seek enterprise crowdfunding will likely need to raise more than $1 million.
Even where the $1 million cap is not a hindrance, the start-up would still
need to comply with the restrictions on general solicitation in order to run
an Internet-based enterprise crowdfunding campaign. State-compliant offerings are still allowed but are arguably limited to state-by-state registration,
disclosure, and sales. 43 They also require the costs of state registration and
disclosure, which the start-up might not be able to afford (and if it could, it
might just as well be able to register the offering for nationwide offers and
sales with the SEC).
The state of the Reg D safe harbors before passage of the JOBS Act
effectively prohibited enterprise crowdfunding. Funding limits, general
solicitation requirements, and limitations on the number of non-accredited
investors conspired in the aggregate to limit enterprise crowdfunding to
state-registered offerings of no more than $1 million. Bold issuers could
seek to embark on an enterprise crowdfunding campaign claiming it was
not a public offering, and thus exempt under Section 4(2) of the Securities
Act. But the very use of a widely available website to advertise the fundraising would almost certainly be deemed a general solicitation, and because offers likely would not be limited to a certain group of investors, the
offering would not fall under Section 4(2). The clamor for enterprise
crowdfunding, in an ongoing recession, and in light of the success of project crowdfunding, did not go unnoticed by Congress and the Obama administration.

43 At least one company has engaged in a state-based enterprise crowdfunding campaign. See
Ownership, BOGUS BREWING, http://www.bogusbrewing.com/ownership/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
Bogus Brewing engaged in a state-registered crowdfunding offering in Idaho, claiming an exemption
from federal registration under Rule 504. However, it might equally have claimed the intrastate exemption under Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act. Thanks to Garrett Hall for bringing this example to my
attention.
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The JOBS Act

In an effort to do something to help the still-ailing economy, Congress
passed the JOBS Act in 2012. 44 President Obama signed it into law on April
5, 2012. 45 It contained many different titles, loosely centered on ways to
help start-ups raise capital. While the CROWDFUND Act within the JOBS
Act for enterprise crowdfunding received significant attention, it is only one
of the many titles within the overall bill. Some of the others may well have
a bigger impact on start-ups than will the CROWDFUND Act. This Section
briefly reviews all the titles within the JOBS Act.
1.

“Emerging Growth Companies”

Title I creates a new issuer classification of “emerging growth companies” that enjoy relaxed mandatory disclosure rules. 46 “Emerging growth
companies” are simply issuers that had less than $1 billion in total annual
gross revenues during their most recently completed fiscal year.47 This
benchmark covers some fairly large businesses, so it is a generous cap.
Such issuers are exempted from some of the disclosure requirements on
executive compensation for reporting companies.48 They also need only
disclose two years’ worth of audited financial statements upon registration
for an initial public offering (“IPO”). 49 Emerging growth companies do not
need to have their internal control systems evaluated by their outside auditors. 50 They also are provisionally exempted from the auditor rotation and
supplemental audit information required of reporting companies under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 51 Perhaps most importantly, Title I relaxes the restrictions on securities analysts, brokers, and dealers for communications
made before, during, or immediately after an emerging growth company’s
IPO, especially with regard to qualified institutional buyers and institutional
accredited investors. 52 It also permits emerging growth companies to submit
confidential “draft” registration statements for their IPOs—in direct con-

44

Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
Id.; President Obama Signs the JOBS Act, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.white
house.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/04/05/president-obama-signs-jobs-act.
46 § 101(a), 126 Stat. at 307.
47 Id.
48 § 102(a), 126 Stat. at 308-09.
49 § 102(b)-(c), 126 Stat. at 309-10. Other issuers need to disclose three years’ worth of audited
financial statements at the time of registration.
50 § 103, 126 Stat. at 310.
51 § 104, 126 Stat. at 310.
52 § 105, 126 Stat. at 310-11.
45
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trast with the existing regime in which any submitted registration statement
is immediately made public through the EDGAR system. 53
2.

General Solicitations Allowed for Rule 506 Offerings

Title II requires the SEC to amend Rule 506 to allow general solicitations for offerings under it. 54 However, this exemption from the prohibition
on general solicitations under Rule 502 is only available where all purchasers of such offers are accredited investors.55 The Act also directs the SEC to
modify the regulations of Rule 144A resales to allow offers to persons other
than qualified institutional buyers, so long as such resales are only made to
persons whom the seller, or its agent, reasonably believes is a qualified institutional buyer. 56 Protections are also given to persons who create platforms for new Rule 506 general solicitation offerings and Rule 144A resales offerings. 57
3.

Crowdfunding

As can be Congress’s penchant, Title III was given an awkward formal
title so that it could be turned into the acronym “CROWDFUND Act.” 58
The parameters through which it mandates the SEC to promulgate formal
rules permitting a new class of exempt transactions under Section 4 of the
Securities Act are complicated. The new exemption will cover only those
offers and sales of a private issuer that:
∗ raise no more than $1 million in the aggregate with all such similarly exempt offerings in a twelve-month period;
∗ do not exceed $2,000 or 5 percent of any particular investor’s net
worth or annual income (where the net worth or annual income is less than
$100,000) aggregated with all purchases by the investor of the issuer’s
stock in a twelve-month period;

53

§ 106(a), 126 Stat. at 312.
§ 201, 126 Stat. at 313-15. The SEC issued its final rules relaxing the prohibition on general
solicitations for Rule 506 offerings in July 2013. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (proposed July
24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242).
55 § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 313-14.
56 § 201(a)(2), 126 Stat. at 314.
57 § 201(c), 126 Stat. at 314-15.
58 § 301, 126 Stat. at 315 (dubbing the Act “the ‘Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud
and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012’ or the ‘CROWDFUND Act’”).
54
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∗ do not exceed 10 percent, with a maximum cap of $100,000, of any
particular investor’s annual income or net worth where the investors annual
income or net worth are equal to or greater than $100,000; and
∗ are conducted through a broker or funding portal complying with a
new Section 4A added to the Securities Act, and the issuer complies with
the provisions of Section 4A as well. 59
Crowdfunding issuers will have liability for material misstatements
and omissions in disclosed material similar to that of IPO issuers. 60 And
crowdfunded securities will be subject to a one-year holding period, with
limited exceptions.61 Issuers must use the private market intermediary portals 62 mandated under the CROWDFUND Act, but this means that such
portals must be created.63 These portals will have significant responsibilities
(and therefore potential liabilities) for obtaining and distributing information on the issuers and background checks on officers, directors, and
other persons holding more than 20 percent of an issuer’s securities. 64 The
portal also needs to ensure that investors are not exceeding their investment
caps.
The CROWDFUND Act also imposes substantial disclosure requirements on crowdfunding issuers. They must disclose to the SEC, the portal
handling the offering, and investors the following:
• name, legal status, physical address, and website address of issuer;
• names of directors, officers, and other persons holding greater than
20 percent of the issuer’s securities;
• description of issuer’s business and a business plan;
• certain financial disclosures, depending on which of the following
three tiers they fall into:
o Offerings of $100,000 or Less: most recent year’s income
tax return; financial statements certified by principal execu59 § 302(a), 126 Stat. at 315. The SEC has clarified an ambiguity in the investor income thresholds. Because the JOBS Act refers both to “annual income or the net worth of the investor is less than
$100,000,” id., and “annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more than $100,000,” id.,
someone with, for example, annual income less than $100,000 but net worth greater than or equal to
$100,000 would seem to fall into both categories. The SEC proposes to treat both categories as conjunctions (and not disjunctions), such that the lower category includes all those with annual income and net
worth (each) less than $100,000, and the higher category includes all those with annual income and net
worth (each) greater than or equal to $100,000. Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,429-30.
60 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2012).
61 Id. § 77d-1(d)-(e).
62 §§ 302, 304, 126 Stat. at 315-22.
63 § 302, 126 Stat. at 315-21. The SEC has extensive rules for such portals, or intermediaries, in
its proposed “Regulation Crowdfunding.” See generally Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,458-96.
64 Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,437-38.
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tive officer to be “true and complete in all material respects”;
o Offerings Above $100,000, Up to $500,000: financial statements reviewed by an independent public accountant using
professional standards and procedures, or standards and procedures established by the SEC;
o Offerings Above $500,000: audited financial statements
• description of stated purpose and intended use of proceeds;
• target offering amount, deadline to reach the target, and regular progress updates;
• price, or method for determining price, of securities;
• description of ownership and capital structure of issuer, including:
o terms of all classes of issuer’s securities, including how they
may be modified and a summary of the differences among
these classes, particularly how the rights of the crowdfunded
securities might be limited, diluted, or qualified by the rights
of any other class;
o description of how principal shareholders’ rights may negatively affect crowdfunding investors;
o name and ownership level of each holder of more than 20
percent of the issuer’s equity;
o method of valuation for offered securities now and in the future;
o risks to crowdfunding investors related to being minority investors, together with risks associated with corporate actions
(including additional share issuances, sale of issuer or assets
of issuer, and transactions with related parties); and
o any other information the SEC may require. 65
Following the offering, the issuer will have to file annual reports with
the SEC which cover the results of operations and financial statements.
Issuers must then provide the reports to investors. Under “Regulation
Crowdfunding,” as the proposal is known, the SEC would require issuers to
submit disclosures through the EDGAR system for public access. 66 This
disclosure requirement makes the crowdfunding exemption particularly
problematic, as discussed in Part II.C below.
Creating a crowdfunding exemption also means that the reporting
company triggers under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act (the
“Exchange Act”) 67 have to be amended. The large number of investors in a
65

15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b); Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,437-49.
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,449-54.
67 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
66
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single crowdfunded offering may well bring the number of issuer investors
over the current cap of five hundred non-accredited investors. 68 Accordingly, the JOBS Act amends the Exchange Act to remove crowdfunding investors from the calculation of shareholders for purposes of triggering reporting company status. 69
4.

“Regulation A+”

On top of allowing general solicitations on Rule 506 offerings and creating the crowdfunding exemption, the JOBS Act also created what has
been dubbed a “Regulation A+” exemption.70 The SEC had promulgated
Regulation A “mini-offerings” in 1992. 71 Under Regulation A, issuers can
offer unrestricted stock in what is essentially a public offering, in amounts
up to $5 million over a twelve-month period, without becoming a reporting
company producing audited financial statements (unless they are otherwise
available). 72 The issuer also has to prepare and submit an offering statement
on Form 1-A, which is similar to a public offering registration statement.
But under the new Regulation A+, issuers can offer up to $50 million on
similar conditions as the original Regulation A. 73
5.

Raising the Triggers for Reporting Company Status

The JOBS Act increased various triggers so that more companies can
stay out of reporting company status longer. 74 The number of shareholders
was increased to two-thousand persons overall, or five hundred nonaccredited investors. 75 Employees holding company securities obtained
through employee compensation plans also do not now count toward these
trigger levels. 76

68

15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012); §§ 501-04, 126 Stat. at 325-26.
§ 303, 126 Stat. at 321.
70 § 402, 126 Stat. at 325.
71 Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,468 (proposed Aug. 13, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
72 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2012).
73 § 401, 126 Stat. at 323-25.
74 §§ 501-04, 126 Stat. at 325-26.
75 § 501, 126 Stat. at 325.
76 § 502, 126 Stat. at 326.
69
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Raising the Triggers for Bank Registration

Title VI of the Act increases the triggers for banks and bank holding
companies to have to register under Sections 12 and 15 of the Exchange
Act. 77 This trigger seems to have been a response to the issue of banks’ reduction of lending, especially to small businesses, in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis and subsequent recession. This solution seems a bit tangential to that problem.
7.

Comparison of New and Amended Capital Raising Models

While crowdfunding has received the most attention—and not all of it
positive—other sections of the JOBS Act may provide better models for
start-up fundraising. Crowdfunding has many detractors, including apparently the SEC, which has delayed rulemaking beyond the 270 days allowed
in the JOBS Act for implementation. In the interim, the SEC has promulgated the rules permitting general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings and
general advertising in Rule 144A offerings. 78 As mentioned, there is no cap
on the amount that can be raised under Rule 506, and the reporting requirements are not much more onerous than those for the crowdfunding
exemption. The key difference is that general solicitation is only permitted
if purchasers are restricted to accredited investors. So it is more like “high
end” crowdfunding. At the same time, both Regulation A and Regulation
A+ allow for general solicitation, higher offering amounts than available
under the crowdfunding exemption, only somewhat more disclosure, and no
restriction to accredited investors. Meanwhile, the existing Rule 504 allows
general solicitation for offerings up to $1 million, so long as the offer is
made exclusively in states that have their own registration systems for public offerings. 79 While this provision is then limited to certain states, as a
practical matter such an offering may be adequate to raise $1 million—
which is all that is permitted under the new crowdfunding exemption anyway. Accordingly, from a purely rational perspective, the new
crowdfunding exemption may not be particularly compelling, especially if
the SEC promulgates restrictive or onerous rules to implement it.

77

§§ 601-602, 126 Stat. at 326-27.
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506
and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts.
230, 239, 242).
79 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(i) (2012). As mentioned above, at least one company has relied on Rule
504 to conduct what it jokingly called an “IPO—Idaho Public Offering,” using Idaho state registration
procedures to conduct an enterprise crowdfunding selling equity. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
78
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The CROWDFUND Act Disclosure Requirements May Present
Serious Risks to Start-Ups’ IP and Business Strategies

Notwithstanding the serious questions about whether the
crowdfunding exemption is advisable from a regulatory perspective, or truly helpful for start-ups, the popular appeal of crowdfunding is such that
many start-ups will likely use it once it is available. On the positive side, it
may be one more avenue for deserving start-ups to access the capital they
need to launch and grow. The focus on equity provides just the kind of
working capital needed for start-ups to get serious about developing their IP
portfolios. But the disclosure required for crowdfunding may present challenges and risks to first-time entrepreneurs. The mandated disclosures will
be made public through the EDGAR system. 80 While the SEC provides for
the redaction of some sensitive, personally identifiable information (e.g.,
social security numbers in tax filings), 81 it is not clear how far redaction
requests could go beyond this. In fact, the SEC takes seriously the relation
between crowdfunding and crowdsourcing, stating:
The proposed rules are intended to align crowdfunding transactions under Section 4(a)(6) [of
the JOBS Act] with the central tenets of the original concept of crowdfunding, in which the
public—or the crowd—is presented with an opportunity to invest in an idea or business and
individuals decide whether or not to invest after sharing information about the idea or business with, and learning from, other members of the crowd. In this role, members of the
crowd are not only sharing information about the idea or business, but also are expected to
help evaluate the idea or business before deciding whether or not to invest. 82

Thus, the SEC clearly intends enough information to be made public about
the issuer that a large number of potential investors can pore over and share,
and that they may use to compare details of its finances, management, business plan, and employees.
The crowdfunding issuer will become a kind of junior reporting company, yet without the experience and legal counsel of a company that makes
it to a traditional public offering. By contrast, Reg D offerings require only
the filing of Form D—which contains minimal information—with the
SEC. 83 The more extensive disclosures required under Reg D are required
to be made available only to purchasers, and thus need not be made public.
At the same time, while private investors often negotiate for even more
information rights than mandated by Reg D, they usually receive it under
confidentiality provisions. The only equivalent requirement for public disclosures is under Regulation A and Regulation A+ offerings. But these al80

Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,453.
Id. at 66,446.
82 Id. at 66,430 (footnote omitted).
83 17 C.F.R. § 230.503; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0076, FORM D, NOTICE OF
EXEMPT OFFERING OF SECURITIES (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.
81
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low for much higher offering amounts ($5 million and $50 million, respectively, versus $1 million for the crowdfunding exemption). Also, the expense and sophistication needed to engage in one of these “mini-offerings”
makes the model impractical for most of the early-stage start-ups that will
likely pursue crowdfunding.
There are substantial risks for early-stage start-ups to enter into an extensive disclosure regime. Such companies rarely have specialized counsel
that can help them navigate the risks involved. Companies pursuing a Regulation A offering or an IPO will generally have sophisticated securities attorneys, as well as IP attorneys if they have significant IP assets. Firms
without such counsel risk disclosing patentable inventions—especially
business methods—before applications have been filed and rights preserved. This issue will be particularly acute for ongoing periodic disclosures, which tend to put time pressure on reporting companies because the
regular deadlines can seem relentless.84 The likely place for such accidental
disclosures will be in the mandated discussion of the firm’s business and
financial condition discussion (compared by the SEC to the management’s
discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations
(known as the “MD&A”) under Regulation S-K for reporting companies). 85
But as the issuer becomes a kind of junior reporting company, it will also
come under increased pressure to make other public statements. These disclosures can be the most perilous, especially where they include live remarks by company representatives (whether verbal or through social media). Descriptions of the company’s proposed products or services for purposes of soliciting support in the crowdfunded offering will risk destroying
patent rights. Part of engaging with the “crowd” may be a broad dialogue in
which all manner of potential investors draw out responses from company
representatives (official or otherwise) which disclose too much about the
company’s plans and technologies. In fact, the SEC anticipates this happening and is already considering whether and how to make such disclosures
part of the formal—and hence possibly liability-generating—disclosures
under “Regulation Crowdfunding.” 86
In the event that potentially enabling disclosures of business methods
or other inventions are made, the company will have to accelerate patentfiling decisions. But without the funding to prepare and file a strong application (lack of funding presumably being a major driver of the
84

Besides regular periodic reporting, the SEC is contemplating requiring material event reporting,
similar to Form 8-K filings under the Exchange Act. See Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66,450-52.
This will put even more time pressure on and distract inexperienced start-ups, increasing the likelihood
of accidental disclosure of sensitive information.
85 Id. at 66,437-44. Because the SEC at this time is not mandating the form of the business and
financial condition disclosure reports, issuers may well overreport to stay on the safe side of an indeterminate line for compliance with Regulation Crowdfunding.
86 Id. at 66,452-54.
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crowdfunding offering), the company may have to file an inferior application, or no application at all. Thus, the crowdfunding effort may negatively
alter the company’s IP strategy timeline.
Ultimately, the disclosure required under the crowdfunding exemption
means that start-ups will need to retain expensive securities and IP counsel
before starting the crowdfunding process. But if they could afford such
counsel, they likely would not be engaged in crowdfunding. The downsides
of mandatory disclosure and a broad investor base (that may or may not
have voting power) should discourage companies from using this funding
model unless they really need it.
Thus, the JOBS Act may unintentionally penalize the very firms that
need its help the most. A number of commentators view the disclosure requirements as necessary to mitigate what might otherwise be a major new
avenue for fraudulent securities scams. 87 However, Professor Edmund Kitch
believes that it was a mistake for Congress to require public disclosures
from crowdfunding companies. 88 But this is because he takes the controversial position that all mandatory disclosure requirements under the federal
securities regulations system were a mistake. 89 In keeping with the arguments for the legalization of gambling and other risky activities, Kitch believes that individuals should have the right to invest their money wherever
they choose, and through whatever means they want, without government
intervention. 90 Thus, he does not have a reason to distinguish crowdfunding
from other investment vehicles. All should be matters purely between issuers and investors with no government role as in mandatory disclosure regimes. But Congress did not take this path, and it arguably tended to the
opposite pole by imposing significant disclosure obligations on certain classes of issuers, now including crowdfunding firms.
The crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act push start-ups into an
advanced regulatory environment they may not be ready for. Whereas other
titles in the JOBS Act allow emerging growth companies to stay private
longer—giving them a longer period of privacy and confidentiality within
which to develop business models, staff, and technologies—the
87

See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 4, at 1736-39.
See, e.g., John Kuo, Equity Crowdfunding Is Now Legal. How Can You Get Your Piece of the
Action?, NERDWALLET (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/equitycrowdfunding-legal-piece-action/ (noting that “Professor Edmund Kitch warns that simpler securities
laws are necessary for equity crowdfunding to truly thrive,” and quoting Professor Kitch as saying, “If
the government would simply create an open space for crowdfunding sites to operate, it could monitor
their development and . . . pursue [specific] intervention. Unfortunately, the JOBS Act is enacted within
the regulatory complexity of current securities law, and does not accomplish this simple goal” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
89 See Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Kitch & O’Connor: Should Crowdfunding Be Regulated?,
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 14, 2013), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2013/09/kitch-oconnorshould-crowdfunding-be.html.
90 See supra note 88.
88
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CROWDFUND Act will rush start-ups who use it and force them to become junior reporting companies. And whereas other titles of the JOBS Act
relax disclosure requirements for other kinds of offerings—including the
new confidential IPO draft registration statement that Twitter recently
used—the CROWDFUND Act imposes arguably a higher-than-usual
amount of disclosure as compared to that required for similarly situated
offerings (e.g., Rule 504 offerings can also raise $1 million but have none
of the public disclosures of the CROWDFUND Act, unless the issuer relies
on the state registration option). The period of privacy is critical for startups that have nearly impossible levels of uncertainty across their business
model, technologies, and markets. Further, the ability to be disruptive often
relies on the element of surprise. A potentially disruptive start-up that needs
to telegraph details about its model and plans through public disclosures
beginning at the earliest stages of the firm is likely to lose much of that
element of surprise and find its ability to successfully disrupt an industry
limited (as the incumbents will have been able to prepare to defend their
entrenched interests).
III. MANAGING CROWDFUNDING INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS ABOUT
START-UP IP PORTFOLIOS
Beyond the disclosure issues affecting start-up IP strategies under the
CROWDFUND Act, the crowdfunding concept generally presents issues
for management’s interaction with shareholders. Publicly traded companies
develop significant expertise and staff just to deal with issues arising with a
large, diffuse set of shareholders. Start-ups will be in no such position to
deal with this kind of base. Further, they may use crowdfunding to avoid
professional investors such as VCs, even though those professionals often
bring valuable expertise that can guide the start-up to develop the sophistication to manage a base of public shareholders.
Professional or experienced start-up investors such as tech angels and
VCs understand the value of IP. They often know more than the founders
about the realities and expenses of building IP portfolios with limited resources. Tough decisions need to be made about what to patent among
competing promising inventions. Timing decisions for applications also
require experience. Likewise, some inventions may be protectable as trade
secrets. And in some industries, such as software, copyright will play an
equal role with patents for protection of the core products developed. On
top of all this, a strong brand—manifested through distinctive, federally
registered trademarks—may play a more important long-term role than
patents on any particular technology. Unsophisticated investors, who may
constitute a large percentage of crowdfunders, will not be able to offer any
help on these matters.
Even if some crowdfunders have such expertise, a start-up would need
to bring them into a special confidential relationship (such as often happens
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with private placement investors) in order to give them privileged information necessary to help develop the IP strategy. But this in turn might run
afoul of fair disclosure concepts, which seek to have all outside shareholders on the same footing with regard to company information. Insiders, by
contrast, will have access to nonpublic information, but they are then restricted in their ability to trade in the company’s stock based on such insider
information. We do not yet know whether the SEC will treat a crowdfunded
issuer as a kind of public company, which requires such insider-outsider
distinctions for information dissemination.
Further, utilizing crowdfunding early in a start-up’s life could deter
professional investors from investing later. Many VCs already lament
bloated cap tables from too many friend and family investors in companies
the VCs are otherwise interested in financing. This situation means unpredictable votes on shareholder issues and more potential for litigation from
early-stage investors who get substantially diluted in later rounds or disagree with the company’s direction and management.
Angels and VCs also usually understand the risks of IP portfolio value
during the life of the company and in bankruptcy or dissolution. Even
though significant amounts of money may have been spent on procuring
patents, the portfolio may be worthless if the product or service to which it
is directed proves to be commercially unfeasible. Of course, the portfolio
may be monetized in other ways, and experienced VCs may have guidance
on this as well. But unsophisticated crowdfunders may wildly over- or underestimate the value of the start-up’s portfolio. This shortcoming, in turn,
could put them at odds with company management in how to manage and
monetize the portfolio.
The upshot is that management may become more conservative because of pressure from crowdfunders with unrealistic expectations about IP
portfolio development and management (as well as about other corporate
matters!). This pressure could escalate into litigation, similar to the shareholder activism we increasingly see in publicly traded companies. Shareholder activism can provide helpful discipline to management of large entities that may get out of touch, but it may not be appropriate for early-stage
start-ups that need a lot of room to maneuver while exploring risky technologies and business models. Some have suggested that crowdfunding only
be done through non-voting stock with mandatory buyout provisions allowing the company to later reduce the cap table.91 Such equity structuring
could indeed reduce problems with crowdfunding shareholders. But the
shareholders would have to agree to buy shares under these conditions. It
remains to be seen whether a crowdfunding market could develop around
such terms.

91 For example, Ted Sichelman offered ideas like this in an IPProfs listserv exchange on
crowdfunding earlier this year.
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Start-ups that employ crowdfunding will have to learn how to manage
the expectations of a broad, diffuse base of shareholders, many of whom
may be quite unsophisticated. In fact, given the “democratizing” effect of
crowdfunding and the low investment amounts possible, the average
crowdfunder may be far less sophisticated than the average retail investor in
public markets. This knowledge gap will require “investor relations” skill
and staff, which may be beyond the tool kit of the usual start-up founder or
employee. Thus, the company may have to retain counsel or consultants to
develop or administer the investor relations function, which will only add to
the start-up’s burn rate.
Provided that the start-up can muster the investor relations function,
one of the main goals of such a program will have to be investor education
about the realities of IP portfolio development and management. First, investors will need to know that patent procurement may be one of the startup’s single largest fixed costs recurring on an annual basis. Second, not
everything will be patentable, nor will the company be able to patent everything that is patentable. Tough decisions will have to be made, and some
seemingly valuable things will be left unprotected. Investors will likely not
have a say in this—and will not know all the important inside information
on the inventions and patent application decisions—and will have to be
comfortable “going along for the ride.” Because of the perceived nature and
rhetoric of crowdfunding, crowdfunders may be more inclined than public
market retail investors to believe they have an active ownership role in the
company—including a say in important management decisions. Finally,
investor relations staff must strive to educate investors that even expensive
patents and impressive-looking IP portfolios may turn out to be worthless
during the life of the company, as well as in bankruptcy or dissolution.
CONCLUSION
The JOBS Act reduces the disclosure required for many forms of financing emerging growth companies. Companies can stay private longer.
They can file confidential draft registration statements for IPOs. Audited
financial statements need only be provided for the preceding two years before going public, not three. Similarly, general solicitation is now available
for certain Rule 506 offerings, and an enhanced “Regulation A+” allows for
mini-public offerings up to $50 million.
Yet, the crowdfunding exemption seems to impose heavier regulation
and mandatory disclosures than the relaxed standard for equivalent alternate
offerings. For a meager $1 million raise, crowdfunded companies will need
to become junior reporting companies. They will need to publicly disclose
information about shareholders who hold more than 20 percent of their equity, as well as the ways in which such shareholders’ equity rights could be
used to harm crowdfunders’ equity rights.
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Despite this inferiority of crowdfunding to other funding avenues, it is
expected that many start-ups will use it once the SEC promulgates the final
rules. The populist and rhetorical appeal of the form—together with the
success of project crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter—virtually ensures
there will be initial attempts to use it for enterprise crowdfunding. If it allows deserving start-ups to obtain funding they would not otherwise have
received, then it may be worth it. This outcome could be especially valuable
for start-ups who need funding to start developing and managing an IP portfolio.
Start-ups that use crowdfunding, however, face a number of potential
issues. First, they will have a broad, diffuse ownership base more like that
of a large public company than of a nimble start-up. Differences of opinion
and challenges to management may be more widespread than in a traditional privately-held start-up. Second, such challenges may well be on IP strategies and tactics. Because the average crowdfunder is likely to be less sophisticated than the angels and VCs that usually invest in start-ups, he may
balk at the expense of patent applications, while also expressing concern
over the necessarily difficult decision to seek patent protection on one invention and not another. Third, the requirements of disclosure on inexperienced young companies may lead to compromised IP assets. Given the reluctance or inability of early-stage start-ups to hire specialized counsel in
corporate law, securities law, and IP, their management may inadvertently
make enabling disclosures that will jeopardize patent rights.
Crowdfunding may help some start-ups financially even as it may
jeopardize their IP strategies and implementation. To minimize this harm,
start-ups will need to develop strong investor relations staff that can manage the expectations of disparate crowdfunders even before the offering
takes place. They will also need to hire experienced securities and IP counsel in advance of the offering. But both of these will require money that the
start-up does not have (else it would not be engaging in the fundraising).
This in turn may limit the effectiveness of enterprise crowdfunding of startups.

